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ARTICLES
INTRODUCTION: THE VOICES AND
GROUPS THAT WILL PRESERVE (WHAT WE
CAN PRESERVE OF) JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE
JoHN Q. BARRETT*
As the 1996 election year commenced, the leading issues of the
day included welfare reform, late-term abortions, Bosnia, immi-
gration, drugs, taxes, the budget deficit, and the budget impasse
that had shut parts of the federal government.' The "hot" national
issues did not include judicial philosophy, federal judicial appoint-
ments, individual judges or particular judicial decisions.
Within weeks, however, that changed, thanks to a single judi-
cial opinion. On January 22, 1996, United States District Judge
Harold Baer, Jr., decided a pretrial motion to suppress evidence in
the then (and now) obscure New York federal drug prosecution of
* Assistant Professor, St. John's University School of Law; Georgetown University, A.B.
1983; Harvard University, J.D. 1986. Thanks to Sam Levine, Jeff Sovern, Brian Tamanaha
and Sarah Walzer for very helpful comments, and to Anne Marie Troiano (SJU Law '99) for
excellent research assistance.
1 See, e.g., Ronald Brownstein, News Analysis: The Budget Stalemate: GOP Fails to Mus-
cle Clinton Into a Deal, L. A. TmIMEs, Jan. 4, 1996, at A12 (suggesting that GOP's efforts to
drive President Clinton into concession on budget appeared to be headed for failure).
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a woman from Detroit named Carol Bayless. Judge Baer decided
to suppress almost eighty pounds of cocaine and heroin that had,
he determined, been seized illegally, and also to suppress Bayless'
videotaped confession to being a drug courier, which was a fruit of
the illegal seizure.2
In response, to put it plainly, political hell broke loose. Critics
seized on two aspects of Judge Baer's decision. One aspect was
the obvious negative impact of the suppression decision on law en-
forcement in the particular case. By suppressing the drug evi-
dence and the confession, Judge Baer effectively had ended the
government's ability to prosecute the defendant, who had con-
fessed post-arrest that she was a regular drug courier between
New York and Detroit. The other aspect was Judge Baer's asser-
tion, in his written opinion, that public knowledge of police corrup-
tion in Manhattan's Washington Heights neighborhood made it
reasonable, not suspicious, for people there to run when they see
police officers looking at them.' For these reasons, Judge Baer and
his decision were subjected to vociferous, sustained public criti-
cism.4 Although he soon reconsidered his decision and determined
2 United States v. Bayless, 913 F. Supp. 232 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (hereinafter "Bayless I").
3 Id. at 242. The following paragraph is, in full context, Judge Baer's analysis of this
"flight" factor:
Moreover, even assuming that one or more of the males ran from the corner once they
were aware of the officers' presence, it is hard to characterize this as evasive conduct.
Police officers, even those traveling in unmarked vehicles, are easily recognized, partic-
ularly, in this area of Manhattan. In fact, the same United States Attorney's Office
which brought this prosecution enjoyed more success in their prosecution of a corrupt
police officer of an anti-crime unit operating in this very neighborhood. Even before
this prosecution and the public hearing and final report of the Mollen Commission,
residents of this neighborhood tended to regard police officers as corrupt, abusive and
violent. After the attendant publicity surrounding the above events, had the men not
run when the cops began to stare at them, it would have been unusual.
Id. (footnotes omitted)
4 Government officials led the criticism of Judge Baer. New York Governor George
Pataki stated that "[tihe judge's decision is despicable." New York Suspect May Walk Away
From Drug Arrest (CNN television broadcast, Jan. 26, 1996). New York City Mayor Ru-
dolph Giuliani, who had been Baer's colleague when each was an Assistant United States
Attorney in the United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York, said
the Judge's ruling was "mind-boggling in its effect," and that the decision was "very, very
troubling and very, very disturbing." Clifford Krauss, Giuliani and Bratton Assail U.S.
Judge's Ruling in Drug Case, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 1996, § 1, at 25. Senator Daniel Patrick
Moynihan (D-NY) recommended that Judge Baer be sentenced to live one year in Washing-
ton Heights, to see if he would run away when he saw police, see A.M. Rosenthal, Contempt
in Court, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 1996, at A15. New York City Police Commissioner William
Bratton called Judge Baer's decision "absolutely crazy" and stated that Baer is "living in a
fairyland." Paul Moses & Joseph W. Queen, Judge: Men Not Wrong to Run From Cops,
NEwsDAY, Jan. 26, 1996, at A3. New York State Attorney General Dennis Vacco said that
judges "should not be handcuffing our cops with arcane technicalities." Greg Smith &
Frank Lombardi, Rudy, Gov. Hit Judge For Axing Drug Case, N.Y. DAILY NEws, Jan. 26,
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less than three months later that the drug evidence could be used
because it had been obtained legally,5 the political criticism of
Judge Baer did not cease - even after the 1996 election season had
come to an end.6
The "Baer episode"7 is not simply an occasion to consider the
facts of the Bayless case or Judge Baer's opinions explaining his
changing decisions.' It also is an opportunity to consider "judicial
1996, at 4. Senate Majority Leader Robert Dole (R-KS) blasted judges who "believe[ ] that
police officers are a bigger threat to the well-being of our communities than those who
peddle drugs to our kids." 142 CONG. REC. S539 (daily ed. Jan. 26, 1996) (statement of Sen.
Dole). Senator Orin Hatch (R-UT) called Baer a "bleeding-heart judge" who "lacks common
sense and judgment." GOVT PRESS RELEASE, Feb. 9, 1996. Speaker of the House Newt Ging-
rich (R-GA) called Judge Baer a "pro-drug dealer, pro-crime" judge. Lawmakers Call for
Resignation of Judge, U.P.I., March 6, 1996. Rep. Fred Upton (R-MI) stated that Judge
Baer is "a Monopoly game gone bad .... handing out 'get-out-of-jail' free cards with reckless
abandon." Id. White House Press Secretary Michael McCurry, speaking on behalf of Presi-
dent Clinton, stated that Judge Baer "made a bad decision." White House Regular Daily
Briefing; Trading Symbols, F.D.C.H. POLITICAL TRANSCRIPTS, March 21, 1996.
Newspaper columnists and editorial writers also were scathing in their criticism of Judge
Baer's ruling. See, e.g., The Drug Judge, WALL ST. J., Jan. 26, 1996, at A10 ("Winning the
war on drugs won't be easy if the battles end up in courtrooms like that of Harold Baer");
Judge Baer Mocks Justice, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Jan. 26, 1996, at 38 ("Federal Judge Harold
Baer has become an accomplice to evil"); A.M. Rosenthal, supra ("some judges use their
social and political inclinations, ego, antagonisms and biases to shape their decisions").
5 United States v. Bayless, 921 F. Supp. 211 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (hereinafter "Bayless II").
6 In March 1997, House Majority Whip Tom DeLay (R-TX) stated that as part of "con-
servative efforts against judicial activism," congressional Republicans would be trying to
impeach federal judges. Although impeachment talk is cheap, one of the judges who sup-
posedly is under consideration for impeachment is Judge Baer. Ralph Z. Hallow, Republi-
cans Out to Impeach "Activist Judges", WASH. TIMES, Mar. 21, 1997, Pt. A, at Al; 143 CONG.
REC. H 1587 (daily ed. Apr. 16, 1997) (statement of Rep. DeLay). Representative DeLay
denied that he was acting for partisan reasons and explained that, "when judges exercise
power not delegated to them by the Constitution, impeachment is a proper tool." Judicial
Misconduct, F.D.C.H. POLITICAL TRANSCRIPTS, May 15, 1997 (statement of Rep. DeLay).
Representative DeLay was not alone in his criticism of Judge Baer. Representative Bob
Barr (R-GA), a former United States Attorney, spoke of the need to explore the option of
impeachment for judges who go beyond the bounds of the Constitution and, as an example,
spoke of the fact that "quantities of mind altering drugs will remain on the streets and
wind up in the veins of our children because a judge believes the police are less trustworthy
as a whole than criminals." Id. (statement of Rep. Barr). Senator John D. Ashcroft (R-MO),
Chairman of the Subcommittee on Constitutional, Federal and Property Rights, has held
two hearings in 1997 on "judicial activism." See Judicial Activism, F.D.C.H. POLITICAL
TRANSCRIPTS, June 11, 1997 (opening statement of Sen. Ashcroft); Judicial Activism,
F.D.C.H. POLITICAL TRANSCRIPTS, July 15, 1997 (opening statement of Sen. Ashcroft).
7 American Bar Association Announcement, August 1996, quoted in Rocco Cammarere,
ABA Directs Aim at Bench-Bashing, N. J. LAWYER, Aug. 12, 1996, at 1.
8 For accounts of the Bayless case facts and some comments on criminal procedure issues
raised by Judge Baer's decisions, see Morgan Cloud, Judges, "Testilying," and the Constitu-
tion, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1341, 1347-50 (1996); Robert M. Pitler, Independent State Search
and Seizure Constitutionalism: The New York State Court of Appeals' Quest for Principled
Decisionmaking, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 346-47 (1996); Carol S. Steiker, Counter-Revolution
in Constitutional Criminal Procedure? Two Audiences, Two Answers, 94 MICH. L. REV.
2466, 2489-90 & n.123 (1996); John B. Owens, Note, Judge Baer and the Politics of the
Fourth Amendment: An Alternative to Bad Man Jurisprudence, 8 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV.
189, 190-91 (1997).
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independence" generally, and the societal forces that define and
affect it at this point in our constitutional development.
As the Baer episode demonstrates, judicial independence en-
compasses two distinct but related concepts of independence.' One
concept is individual judicial independence. This concept, which
focuses on each particular judge, seeks to insure his or her ability
to decide claims with autonomy within the constraints of law. An
individual judge has this kind of independence when she can do
her job without having to hear - or at least without having to
take it seriously if she does hear - criticisms of her personal mo-
rality and her fitness for judicial office. The second concept is in-
stitutional judicial independence. It focuses on the independence
of the judiciary as a branch of government. It protects judges as a
class from actions by the executive and legislative branches of gov-
ernment and their constituent members.
Both of these concepts - the independence of the individual
judge and the independence of the judicial branch - are fluid and
evolving. They constantly are defined and redefined by five types
of voices that speak and get heard on issues of judicial indepen-
dence. These are the voices of judges, politicians, the media, the
judiciary and the legal profession.
THE JUDGE
A judge speaks, and thus defines the judicial image and the
credibility of the judicial role in the eyes of the public, through the
quality of his or her work and conduct on the bench. Among the
many threats to judicial independence, the most serious may be
the judges who fail to judge, or to explain their judging, well.
Although there are many particular notions of "good judging,"
most lists of its components would include obeying the law and
achieving justice. 10 In addition, at the level of craft, good judging
includes maintaining an even temperament, taking hands-on re-
sponsibility for the work, communicating effectively, and gener-
9 See Shirley S. Abrahamson, Remarks of the Hon. Shirley S. Abrahamson Before the
American Bar Association Commission on Separation of Powers and Judicial Indepen-
dence, Washington, D.C., December 13, 1996, 12 ST. JoHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 71 (1996)
(distinguishing between institutional judicial independence and individual judicial
independence).
10 For an extensive summary and analysis of studies and explanations of judicial deci-
sionmaking as a process, see BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, REALISTIC Socio-LEGAL THEORY: PRAG-
MATISM AND A SOCIAL THEORY OF LAw 196-227 (1997).
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ally seeking to embody propriety in all aspects of one's life on and
off the bench." These are not matters that can be decreed through
the Code of Judicial Conduct. They exist in the judge who can,
and who remembers to try to, summon them from within.
What is the right judicial temperament? As it relates to judicial
independence, the ideal temperament is the judge who as much as
humanly possible keeps her head down, ignores the world's lobby-
ing pressures and simply does her job of making decisions that
follow the law and achieve just outcomes.' For most judges, it will
be a constant struggle to attain this ideal. 13 One reason to value
judicial independence is that it enables judges to recognize this
ideal and to strive to attain it, which in turn helps reinforce the
public's view that this is what the job of judging demands, which
in turn translates into public support for judicial independence.
The second component of good judging, taking complete respon-
sibility for the substance of how the job is done, including the con-
tent of judicial opinions, is implicit in the concept of individual
judicial independence. Judging, even as a member of a panel, is
and needs to be a solo endeavor. Although judicial resources -
particularly each judge's staff of law clerks and interns - have
grown in recent decades, the workload of each judge has outstrip-
ped the expansion of his staff.'4 The resulting temptation is for a
judge to manage the workload, to decide matters faster, by using
staff work too casually, without giving it the true attention and
review that would make this work the judge's own. There is no
need or practical way for a judge to spend her career in solitary
11 See generally JEFFREY M. SHAMAN ET AL., JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND ETHICS (2d ed. 1995);
JOHN T. NOONAN, JR. & KENNETH I. WINSTON, EDS., THE RESPONSIBLE JUDGE: READINGS IN
JUDICIAL ETHICS (1993); JOHN P. MACKENZIE, THE APPEARANCE OF JUSTICE (1974).
12 See John D. Feerick, Judicial Independence and the Impartial Administration of Jus-
tice, 51 RECORD OF THE AS'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y. 233, 239 (1996) ("the inde-
pendence of the Judiciary is the right of a free people and therefore an obligation ofjudges
rather than a privilege which they enjoy").
13 See What is Judicial Independence? Views from the Public, the Press, the Profession,
and the Politicians, 80 JUDICATURE 73, 75 (1996). Judge William M. Hoeveler of the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Florida has said that "[elven though we
[federal judges] have life tenure, we're human; don't ever think we're not subject to outside
pressures. The press, public approval, polls - there are a variety of forces that invade our
thinking or at least try to invade our thinking." Id.
14 See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 59,
139 (1996); Thomas Grey, Holmes's Language of Judging - Some Philistine Remarks, 70
ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 5, 6 (1996) ("[law clerks often draft the opinions, which judges then read
over to see if they say anything the judge doesn't want said at the time. There are excep-
tions to this practice, but this was the norm 25 years ago when I was a law clerk, and my
impression is that if anything the exceptions are fewer today.") (footnote omitted).
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confinement, handling everything by herself. There is a need, de-
manded by the ideal of judicial independence, for each judge to do
her own deciding and explaining, if only to eliminate corrosive
speculation that she has not done so and, even worse, that she
cannot do so.
15
The third component of good judging, effective communication,
is one key way that a judge takes responsibility for her judgments.
Judging is a private mental act, but the announcement of a judi-
cial decision becomes a matter of public interest, at least for the
litigants and often for a larger world. One factor that will deter-
mine the credibility of a judge's decision is the quality of the
judge's explanation. Well-reasoned, written (or transcribed, as
they are delivered from the bench) explanations may provoke at-
tacks, but they also offer bases for higher courts and for the audi-
ence to understand why a judge did what she did.16 Quality rea-
soning has legs to stand on. Weaker explanations, by contrast,
deserve not to and usually will not withstand much scrutiny. 7
15 See POSNER, supra note 14, at 140-45, 150, 157.
16 See Judith S. Kaye, Safeguarding a Crown Jewel: Judicial Independence and Lawyer
Criticism of Courts, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 703, 723-24 (1997) (urging judges to communicate
their decisions more carefully and comprehensibly).
17 For one example of the need for persuasive explanations ofjudicial decisions, compare
Judge Baer's treatments in Bayless of two widely known, unfortunate characteristics of
Manhattan's Washington Heights neighborhood: the prevalence of drug dealing and,
closely related to it, the prevalence of police corruption. Both characteristics of the neigh-
borhood are widely known in part because of the 1994 Mollen Commission report on New
York City police corruption. See COMMISSION REPORT, THE CITY OF NEW YORK COMMISSION
TO INVESTIGATE ALLEGATIONS OF POLICE CORRUPTION AND THE ANTI-CORRUPION PROCE-
DURES OF THE POLICE DEPARTMENT (July 7, 1994) (hereinafter Mollen Commission Re-
port"), reprinted in 6 NEW YORK CITY POLICE CORRUPTION INVESTIGATION COMMISSIONS,
1894-1994 (Gabriel J. Chin ed., 1997). Harold Baer served, prior to becoming a federal
judge, as one of the five members of the Mollen Commission. In Bayless I, Judge Baer
referred explicitly to the Mollen Commission report to explain why it was reasonable, not
suspicious, for a citizen to run from a police officer in Washington Heights. See supra note 3
(quoting Bayless 1, 913 F. Supp. at 242.) But Judge Baer, in the same opinion, neither took
judicial notice of the fact that Washington Heights is a high drug-trafficking area nor
credited a police officer's unchallenged and more specific testimony to that effect in the
suppression hearing. See Bayless 1, 913 F. Supp. at 240 n.12 ("Interestingly, the Govern-
ment offered no proof to corroborate their statement that the area surrounding 176th
Street and St. Nicholas Avenue is a known hub of the drug trade."). Judge Baer's incredu-
lity regarding the officer's testimony seems forced and implausible, given the Mollen Com-
mission's repeated references to drug trafficking in the police precincts that comprise
Washington Heights. See Mollen Commission Report, supra, at 4 ("drug ridden streets of
Northern Brooklyn, Upper Manhattan"), 21 ("Manhattan North's 30th Precinct, where
large-scale, cash-laden drug traffickers operate"), 29 ("Because the quantities of drugs
transported in the 30th Precinct are often so large, skimming even part of the drugs could
lead to thousands of dollars in profits."). Judicial ignorance of drug dealing in Washington
Heights was, however, necessary to the logic of Judge Baer's rejection of the government's
use of the "bad neighborhood" factor as one circumstance that gave rise to reasonable suspi-
cion that Ms. Bayless was involved in criminal activity. (In Bayless II, after the government
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The final component of good judging, an appearance of propri-
ety, is the external perception of judicial performance that judges
consciously should seek to create.18 They should do this not by
spin (which usually will not work in any event), but by behaving
properly under the Code and by attaining the virtues discussed
previously (i.e., displaying even temperament, exercising hands
on responsibility for their judging, and communicating their rea-
soning effectively). In addition, as it relates specifically to judicial
independence, a judge should be particularly conscious not to com-
municate anything that could contribute to an impression that his
independence could be or has been affected.
THE POLITICIANS
Elected officials who care to take judicial independence seri-
ously while offering their comments on judicial decisions also
could choose to abide by some obvious norms of good behavior.
The starting point, basic as it seems, would be to become informed
about the relevant law, the facts and the judge's reasoning, and to
do so before speaking about any particular case or judicial rul-
ing. 9 Officials also could improve the quality of public discourse
on legal matters and judicial performance by eliminating mean-
ingless adjectives, such as "activist," from their vocabularies.
They also could refrain from making ad hominem attacks on indi-
vidual judges, and from threatening judges' jobs by talking of res-
ignation or impeachment, when they comment on the reasoning
behind specific judicial decisions.
The reality of our time, however, is that today's judge-bashers
probably will not change their behavior. As the Baer episode illus-
trates, politicians regularly become demagogues on crime-related
issues and, in the search to find someone to blame for crime
problems that they and we have not solved, a judge who recently,
conveniently, has enforced a statute or a constitutional provision
presented further evidence of the prevalence of drug trafficking in Washington Heights,
Judge Baer reversed course, criticized the government for not offering additional evidence
earlier, and implied that the existence of drug dealing in Washington Heights was revela-
tion to him. Bayless 11, 921 F. Supp. at 215 n.4).
18 See Shirley S. Abrahamson, Foreword, in SHAMAN, supra note 11, at v.
19 Judge Baer apparently does not believe that many of his critics bothered to read his
Bayless opinions. See Bayless H, 921 F. Supp. at 214 ("For those who may take the time to
read this decision, a word about the law and how it regards the issue of credibility may be
helpful.").
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and thereby thwarted all-out law enforcement can become the
"punching bag"20 of choice. The judge becomes an attractive tar-
get not only because her decision has touched a hot button crime
issue, but also because the judge's sense of propriety, given her
professional role and her typical reluctance to engage in political
disputes, predictably will mean that she will not respond aggres-
sively once the bashing begins. The temptation for a politician to
judge-bash becomes all the greater when a politician is seeking
election or reelection, as most of Judge Baer's critics were or are,
because judge-bashing is believed to be a good political tactic.
THE MEDIA
Judge-bashing works, and thus it continues, because it fits well
with two of our media's obsessions (which may accurately reflect
the general public's obsessions): reporting crime-related stories,
and reporting general allegations of official misconduct. This is
particularly true of television news reporting, and it is all the
more true when the issue is drug-related crime or the claim that a
law-breaker has gone free because of a judicial decision. If a poli-
tician says that a judge has done something outrageous by dis-
missing a case and sending a "criminal" back into the community,
that apparently is news to be reported, without any visible exer-
cise of editorial judgment by the media. Indeed, the media often
seem, through tabloid headlines, "news" stories and editorials,
themselves to lead, or at least to join in, the bashing. The media
also seem to lack a strong commitment to reporting and educating
the public about our heritage and constitutional commitment to
the principle of an independent judiciary.2
Good reporting could support judicial independence and thus
give some protection to a judge who is under siege. One story to
report, in general but particularly when judges are under attack,
20 See Interview: A Unique Perspective on Judicial Independence, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV.
799, 810 (1997) (interview by Professor Roy D. Simon, Jr., and Ms. Karen E. Baldwin of
Judge Harold Baer, Jr.) (hereinafter "Judge Baer Interview") (noting that "judges can easily
become punching bags because there is little that they can say" in response to politicians
who bash them).
21 The irony is that, at the same time it gives such prominent platforms to judge-
bashers, the media report concerns about threats to or the absence of judicial independence
in countries around the world. See, e.g., Commission Co-Chairs Express Concern About De-
velopments in Albania, P.R. NEWSWIRE, Mar. 3, 1997 (quoting a joint statement issued by
Senator Alfonse D'Amato (R-NY) and Representative Christopher H. Smith (R-NJ)); Ed-
ward A. Gargan, In Hong Kong, There Is Constitutional Law, But Whose?, N. Y. TIMES, July
23, 1997, at A3.
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is our history of correct, courageous and independent judicial deci-
sions. Media also could begin to communicate the simple truth
that, although constitutional rights sometimes will impede the ef-
ficiency of law enforcement, our country is based on the defining
choice to make that sacrifice in the interests of personal liberty.22
When the next round of bashing a judge for rendering a decision
commences, the media could report that the official misconduct is
the bashing, not the judging. The media also could criticize, and
sometimes just ignore, the judge-bashers who seek their attention.
These prescriptions for better, more constitutionally true re-
porting require a level of understanding and a kind of courage,
including the courage to forgo the profits that apparently come
from sensationalized coverage of crime stories and official name-
calling, that has not been seen much in our media recently. 23 Per-
haps one hope is that the proliferation of new media - court sys-
tem web sites that reproduce original exhibits and hearing tran-
scripts and contain audiotapes and videotapes of court
proceedings; bar association and other web sites that collect his-
torical materials explaining the importance of judicial indepen-
dence; and electronic newsletters explaining and defending judi-
cial decisions that are automatically disseminated to government
officials, traditional media and other opinion leaders - along with
the related decline of traditional television news, will create ve-
nues for more responsible voices.
THE JUDICIARY
The judiciary itself must continue to be a voice that explains
and thus preserves its own independence. The highlight of the
22 As Justice Brennan once noted,
what the Framers understood [in 1791] remains true today - that the task of combat-
ing crime and convicting the guilty will in every era seem of such critical and pressing
concern that we may be lured by the temptations of expediency into forsaking our com-
mitment to protecting individual liberty and privacy. It was for that very reason that
the Framers of the Bill of Rights insisted that law enforcement efforts be permanently
and unambiguously restricted in order to preserve personal freedoms. In the constitu-
tional scheme they ordained, the sometimes unpopular task of ensuring that the gov-
ernment's enforcement efforts remain within the strict boundaries fixed by the Fourth
Amendment was entrusted to the courts.
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 929-30 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting); accord United
States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 789-90 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
23 See generally William L. Howard, We Pursue Different Objectives ... They Aren't Al-
ways Compatible, QUILL, Oct. 1996, at 24 (assessing judicial-media relations based on his
experience as the trial judge in South Carolina's 1995 prosecution of Susan Smith).
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Bayless case - to date, for the case is not over 21 - is the remark-
able statement that was issued by the then Chief Judge and the
former Chief Judges of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit in response to the political criticism of Judge
Baer's first decision and the calls for his resignation.25 Chief
Judge Jon 0. Newman, joined by former Chief Judges J. Edward
Lumbard, Wilfred Feinberg and James L. Oakes, issued the fol-
lowing document on March 28, 1996:
The recent attacks on a trial judge of our Circuit have gone
too far. They threaten to weaken the constitutional structure
of this nation, which has well served our citizens for more
than 200 years.
Last Friday, the White House press secretary announced
that the President would await the judge's decision on a pend-
ing motion to reconsider a prior ruling before deciding
whether to call for the judge's resignation. The plain implica-
tion is that the judge should resign if his decision is contrary
to the President's preference. That attack is an extraordinary
intimidation.
Last Saturday, the Senate Majority Leader escalated the
attack by stating that if the judge does not resign, he should
be impeached. The Constitution limits impeachment to those
who have committed "high crimes and misdemeanors." A rul-
ing in a contested case cannot remotely be considered a
ground for impeachment.
These attacks do a grave disservice to the principle of an
independent judiciary, and, more significantly, mislead the
public as to the role of judges in a constitutional democracy.
The Framers of our Constitution gave federal judges life
tenure, after nomination by the President and confirmation
by the Senate. They did not provide for resignation or im-
24 After Judge Baer reconsidered his suppression decision (and after he then recused
himself from the case), the case was reassigned to another Judge. Ms. Bayless then pleaded
guilty to three felony charges. Don Van Natta, A Publicized Drug Courier Pleads Guilty to 3
Felonies, N.Y. TmEms, June 22, 1996, at 23. Over the course of the next fifteen months, the
Judge set and then continued a number of sentencing dates. Ms. Bayless also testified dur-
ing this period as a government witness in a drug prosecution in Detroit. As of October
1997, she was still awaiting sentencing. After Ms. Bayless finally is sentenced on the
counts to which she pleaded guilty, she is likely to appeal her case to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Her guilty plea explicitly preserved her rights to
appellate review of Judge Baer's decisions, including his initial denial of a recusal motion
and his ultimate denial of the suppression motion. She also may, on appeal, challenge
Judge Baer's reconsideration, in a climate of great political pressure, of his initial decision
to suppress the drug evidence and the confession.
25 See Second Circuit Chief Judges Criticize Attacks on Judge Baer, N.Y. L.J., March 29,
1996, at 4 (printing statement released by judges on previous day).
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peachment whenever a judge makes a decision with which
elected officials disagree.
Judges are called upon to make hundreds of decisions each
year. These decisions are made after consideration of oppos-
ing contentions, both of which are often based on reasonable
interpretations of the law of the United States and the Consti-
tution. Most rulings are subject to appeal, as is the one that
has occasioned these attacks.
When a judge is threatened with a call for resignation or
impeachment because of disagreement with a ruling, the en-
tire process of orderly resolution of legal disputes is
undermined.
We have no quarrel with criticism of any decision rendered
by any judge. Informed comment and disagreement from law-
yers, academics, and public officials have been hallmarks of
the American legal tradition.
But there is an important line between legitimate criticism
of a decision and illegitimate attack upon a judge. Criticism
of a decision can illuminate issues and sometimes point the
way toward better decisions. Attacks on a judge risk inhibi-
tion of all judges as they conscientiously endeavor to dis-
charge their constitutional responsibilities.
In most circumstances, we would be constrained from mak-
ing this statement by the Code of Conduct for United States
Judges, which precludes public comment about a pending
case. However, the Code also place on judges an affirmative
duty to uphold the integrity and independence of the judici-
ary. In this instance, we believe our duty under this latter
provision overrides whatever indirect comment on a pending
case might be inferred from this statement (and we intend
none).
We urge reconsideration of this rhetoric. We do so not be-
cause we doubt the courage of the federal judges of this Cir-
cuit, or of this nation. They have endured attacks, both ver-
bal and physical, and they have established a tradition of
judicial independence and faithful regard for the Constitution
that is the envy of the world. We are confident they will re-
main steadfast to that tradition.
Rather, we urge that attacks on a judge of our Circuit cease
because of the disservice they do to the Constitution and the
danger they create of seriously misleading the American pub-
lic as to the proper functioning of the federal judiciary.
Each of us has important responsibilities in a constitutional
democracy. All of the judges of this Circuit will continue to
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discharge theirs. We implore the leaders of the Executive and
Legislative Branches to abide by theirs.2 6
The Chief Justice of the United States,27 the Chief Judge of the
New York Court of Appeals, 28 and many other judges - some of
whose contributions are published in this issue - made similar
statements, speeches and writings in defense of judicial
independence.
Although judicial responses to judge bashing may not persuade
or silence the bashers, such responses can have a salutary effect to
the extent that they go over the bashers' heads and reach the pub-
lic directly. 29 The media, of course, may not help, or they even may
get in the way. But just as the media find it difficult to ignore
elected officials and candidates who attack a judge for rendering
particular decisions, they will be hard pressed to ignore clear,
principled responses by respected judges and groups of judges. 0
Judges should recognize all the more that the principle of judicial
independence has resonance with the general public. 3 ' When a
judge's right to remain in office is unfairly attacked, the idea of
judicial independence itself is the weapon with which the courts
and judges can fight back.12
26 Id.
27 See William H. Rehnquist, Keynote Address, Symposium: The Future of the Federal
Courts, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 267, 271-74 (1996) (noting that failed impeachment of Justice
Samuel Chase and Marbury v. Madison were important in securing judicial independence);
Chief Justice Speaks On Independence, THE THIRD BRANCH, May 1996, available at <httpJ/
www.uscourts.gov/ttb/may96/indep.htm>> (reporting that Chief Justice stated that judici-
ary must change with times but that independence is essential to its proper functioning).
28 See Gary Spencer, Kaye Warns of Attacks on Court, Press Coverage Seen Harming
'Confidence', N.Y.L.J., Apr. 18, 1996, at 1 (regarding Chief Judge Kaye's 1996 State of the
Judiciary Message). In an article that appeared in print after this Introduction was writ-
ten, Chief Judge Kaye considered the topic ofjudicial independence in detail and the proper
roles of lawyers, judges, the media and the public. See Kaye, supra note 16.
29 As Judge Stephen McEwen points out in his interesting contribution to this issue,
kind and collegial words by judges about each other bolster the reputations of courts as
institutions and make for better working conditions inside the judiciary. See Stephen
McEwen, "Not Even Dicta", 12 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 113 (1996).
30 See Robert Marquand, Why America Puts Its Supreme Court on Lofty Pedestal, CHRIS-
TIAN SCI. MONITOR, June 25, 1997, at 1 (suggesting that public overwhelmingly supports
and follows decisions of Supreme Court).
31 See Gary Spencer, Poll Finds Public Support for Independent Judiciary, N.Y. L.J.,
June 19, 1996, at 1 (stating that New York's judges have widespread public support).
32 Recent legal literature contains a number of powerful defenses by judges of judicial
independence. See, e.g., Joseph W. Bellacosa, Judging Cases v. Courting Public Opinion, 65
FoRDAm L. REV. 2381 (1997); Hon. Michael Daly Hawkins, Dining With the Dogs: Reflec-
tions on the Criticisms of Judges, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1353 (1996); Louis H. Pollak, Criticizing
Judges, 79 JUDICATURE 299 (1996).
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Judges have not been alone in defending judicial independence.
Practicing lawyers,3 3 bar associations,34 law schools and law
professors,35 and former judges 36 have responded to the attacks on
Judge Baer and other judges by speaking out and writing, by host-
ing discussions, and generally by calling attention to the value of
judicial independence and the threats it now (and always?) faces.
If there is room for additional useful action, it may be at the
level of the individual lawyer. We each should speak out about
judicial independence, both when a particular judge faces specific
threats and in defense of the principle itself. Each lawyer can -
as a parent; as a classroom visitor; as an employer of law student
interns - easily reach and casually but crucially teach some
group of citizens about the value and history of our independent
judiciary. Most lawyers have family members or friends who, hav-
ing seen or read a "judge causes crime" story, will ask a question
33 See, e.g., Stephen B. Bright, Casualties of the War on Crime: Fairness, Reliability and
Credibility of Criminal Justice Systems, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 413 (1997); Stephen B. Bright,
Political Attacks on the Judiciary: Can Justice Be Done Amid Efforts to Intimidate and
Remove Judges from Office for Unpopular Decisions?, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 308 (1997); Mario
M. Cuomo, Some Thoughts on Judicial Independence, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 298 (1997); Feer-
ick, supra note 12; John Gibeaut, Taking Aim, 82 A.B.A. J. 50 (1996); Edward I. Koch, The
Independence of the Judiciary?, 1 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 457 (1996).
34 See, e.g., Symposium: Independence Under Siege: Unbridled Criticism of Judges and
Prosecutors, 5 J.L. & POL'Y 509, 509 (1997) (transcribing panel discussion sponsored by the
Brooklyn Women's Bar Association); Defending Judge Baer, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 1, 1996, at 2
(statements submitted by New York Council of Criminal Defense Lawyers and New York
County Lawyers' Association); Daniel Wise, 26 Bar Groups Join to Defend Judiciary, N.Y.
L.J., Mar. 8, 1996, at 2 (publishing statement issued by 26 lawyers' organizations and 6 law
school deans comprising Joint Committee to Preserve the Independence of the Judiciary).
35 See, e.g., Federal Judicial Independence Symposium, 46 MERCER L. REV. 637, 638-39
(1995) (discussing need for judicial independence); Charles Gardner Geyh, Paradise Lost,
Paradigm Found: Redefining the Judiciary's Imperiled Role in Congress, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1165, 1165 (1996) (proposing creation of commission to study role of judiciary's interaction
with Congress); Thomas E. Plank, The Essential Elements of Judicial Independence and
the Experience of Pre-Soviet Russia, 5 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 1, 1 (1996) (identifying four
institutional elements of independent judiciary: fixed tenure, fixed and adequate compen-
sation, minimum qualifications, and limited civil immunity).
36 See H. Lee Sarokin, A Judge Speaks Out, THE NATION, Oct. 13, 1997, at 15. Judge
Sarokin, a former District Judge, United States District Court for the District of New
Jersey, and then a Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit,
retired in 1996 "in protest over the politicization (what I characterize as the 'Willie
Hortonizing') of the federal judiciary." Id. For another former judge's powerful defense of
judicial independence, see Penny J. White, It's a Wonderful Life, Or Is It? America Without
Judicial Independence, 27 U. MEM. L. REV. 1, 3 (1996).
37 See, e.g., Judicial Activism: Assessing the Impact, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on
the Constitution, Federalism and Property Rights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
July 15, 1997 (opening statement of Chairman John Ashcroft), available in 1997 WL
12100970 ("But while constituents outside of Kansas City may not always complain about
judicial activism by name, often they are complaining about problems - from forced bus-
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that can lead to an educational conversation. Some lawyers know
the politicians who should know better but judge-bash anyway.
These lawyers should, in private, where honesty and persuasion
might be possible, call the politicians on their judge-bashing and
seek to improve their behavior. Some lawyers are in positions to
counsel media clients about the importance of preserving every
judge's ability to decide cases independently. These lawyers
should become counselors for judicial independence.
In this issue, the St. John's Journal of Legal Commentary as-
sembles significant and varied portions of our profession's ongoing
discussion of judicial independence. This issue of the Journal in-
cludes recent remarks and writings relating to the broad topic of
judicial independence by some of our leading judges and lawyers.
The distinguished contributors include federal and state high
court judges (Justice Stevens, Judge Titone and Chief Justice
Abrahamson), a federal appellate judge (Judge Walker), federal
and state trial court judges (Judge Pollak and Judge McEwen),
state administrative judges (Judges Endris and Penrod) and lead-
ers of the practicing bar (Ms. Ramo and Mr. Cooper). This issue
also includes law student Notes and a lawyer's paper. These
works address a range of judicial decisions and legal issues that
are themselves occasions for, and we hope of, judicial
independence.
Justice John Paul Stevens' contribution to this issue is the wide-
ranging and notable address that he delivered to the opening as-
sembly of the American Bar Association's 1996 annual meeting.
He reminds us that we all - litigants, commentators, and even
judges - should be humble in venturing to predict how any per-
son will, as a judge, decide a novel legal issue, because such pre-
dictions will often be wrong. 8 Justice Stevens explains what
ing, to high crime, to the decay of our urban areas - where judicial activism is the root
cause.").
38 Justice Stevens' remarks relate, at least indirectly, to the American Bar Association's
long-standing practice of providing, through its Standing Committee on the Federal Judici-
ary, its independent and professional evaluations on the qualifications of potential nomi-
nees to the lower federal courts, and of Presidential nominees to the United States
Supreme Court. In this vein, two former ABA Presidents, Roberta Cooper Ramo and N. Lee
Cooper, contribute to this issue their opening statements at a May 1996 hearing of the
Senate Judiciary Committee. Although these remarks explain and demystify the ABA's
judicial evaluation process, they did not calm some Republicans' concerns about the ABA's
politics. In February 1997, after the ABA House of Delegates passed a resolution calling for
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should be an obvious point but apparently, for too many political
critics, is not: that judges are people of good will. They read and
listen carefully to the presentations of skilled and committed ad-
vocates. As a result, Justice Stevens reports from experience,
judges can be and regularly are persuaded to make decisions that
differ from the judges' prior assumptions about how they would
decide various issues. Judge-watchers (and especially judge-crit-
ics) who read and learn from this wise essay may grow to appreci-
ate the honest and conscientious effort that typically is involved in
judging, and perhaps then they may temper their criticisms.
Judge Vito Titone of the New York Court of Appeals contributes
remarks that he delivered to fellow St. John's University law
alumni in October 1996. Judge Titone laments the growing trend
of politicians attacking the courts generally and specifically criti-
cizing isolated rulings of individual judges for being "soft on
crime." In pointed terms, Judge Titone reminds these judge-
bashers - even though the reminder may not have much effect
(as he notes, the political judge-bashers tend to be lawyers who
already know better but keep on doing what they are doing to
achieve short term, politically manipulative ends) - that the judi-
cial job is to protect the legal rights of all citizens, not to "fight
crime."
Judge John Walker of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit shares the remarks he delivered in December
1996, as the representative of the Federal Judges' Association, to
the American Bar Association's Commission on Separation of
Powers and Judicial Independence. 9 Judge Walker first discusses
the heritage of our constitutional system of judicial independence,
including the experience in England of the King removing judges
from office, the colonial grievances about the absence of an in-
a moratorium on the death penalty, Senator Orrin Hatch (R-UT), Chairman of the Judici-
ary Committee, announced that he was ending the ABA's official role of advising the Senate
on judicial nominees. See Terry Carter, A Conservative Juggernaut, 83 A.B.A. J. 32 (June
1997).
39 The ABA Commission on Separation of Powers and Judicial Independence was cre-
ated in the summer of 1996, in the climate of judge-bashing that included the attacks on
Judge Baer. The Commission, an initiative of then ABA President Cooper to maintain pub-
lic confidence in the judicial system, see Henry J. Reske, Where to Draw the Line, 82 A.B.A.
J. 99 (Dec. 1996), was comprised of both ABA and non-ABA members. The Commission
held hearings and received testimony, including earlier versions of some of the contents of
this issue, in October and December 1996 and in February 1997. This testimony and the
Commission's July 4, 1997, final report, AN INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY, are available on the
ABA web site, <<http'//www.abanet.org/govaffairs>>.
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dependent judiciary that are recorded in the Declaration of Inde-
pendence, the federalist perspective leading up to the framing of
the Constitution in 1787, and the protections embodied in its Arti-
cle III. Judge Walker then speaks directly to the attacks on Judge
Baer for his initial Bayless decision and calls for people (especially
lawyers) of "good sense" to distinguish attempts to intimidate
judges through personal attacks from proper and thoughtful criti-
cism of judicial decisions. Judge Walker concludes by addressing
two systemic threats to judicial independence that exist in the ju-
diciary's relations with the political branches. One threat is the
federal budget process, an annual occasion of temptation for Con-
gress and the President to become too involved in the sovereign
affairs of the judiciary.4" The other threat is Congress' general in-
action on the issue of inflation eroding the real salaries of federal
judges.4 ' Judge Walker connects the salary issue directly to the
issue of judicial independence by pointing out the inappropriate-
ness of judges, who regularly review the constitutionality and le-
gality of executive and legislative acts, having to come to those
branches as supplicants seeking preservation of their own
salaries.
Judge Louis Pollak of the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania (and, more specifically, a leading
"Philadelphia lawyer")42 publishes here the remarks he delivered
40 Judge Walker notes that the Line Item Veto Act, 2 U.S.C. § 691 et seq. (Supp. 1997),
which does not exempt the judiciary, may someday be used by a President to affect the
budget of the federal judiciary.
41 See generally Judges Barefoot Sanders & Joyce Hens Green, A COLA for Judges, Too,
WASH. POST., Oct. 5, 1997, at C6 (letter to the editor); Dana E. McDonald, Judicial Indepen-
dence Is Threatened When Judicial Pay Doesn't Keep Pace with Inflation, LEGAL TIMEs,
Mar. 17, 1997, at 25; William H. Rehnquist, 1996 Year-End Report on the Federal Judici-
ary, <<http://www.uscourts.gov/cj96.htm>> ("Unfortunately, judges can only regret that
Congress failed to repeal Section 140 of the Continuing Resolution Act of December 15,
1981,... which provides that no cost-of-living salary increases shall be granted to federal
judges without express legislative approval.... Congress compounded the negative impact
of failing to repeal Section 140 when it declined in October [1996] to approve the 2.3 per-
cent Employment Cost Index ("ECI") adjustment in salary for federal judges in January of
1997.").
In November 1997, Congress passed an appropriations bill that will give federal judges,
for the first time in five years, a cost-of-living salary increase of 2.3 percent. See T.R.
Goldman, Spending Bill Alters Legal Landscape, LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 17, 1997, at 1, 19. This
one-time measure does not address the larger problem of federal judicial salary erosion
over time, nor does it remove the issue of proper federal judicial compensation from the
political vagaries of the annual appropriations process.
42 This label is offered as a compliment. Cf Louis H. Pollak, Philadelphia Lawyer: A
Cautionary Tale, 145 U. PA. L. REv. 495, 495-96 (1997) (regarding the judicial career of
Supreme Court Justice Owen J. Roberts, who prior to his tenure on Court was a practicing
lawyer and an adjunct professor at University of Pennsylvania Law School and, after leav-
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to the ABA Commission in October 1996. Judge Pollak adds to the
backdrop that Judge Walker sketches by reviewing our constitu-
tional law and history in the tumultuous few decades that began
with Alexander Hamilton's essays of 1788.13 Judge Pollak consid-
ers Hamilton's explanations of the Constitution's provisions creat-
ing judges who are secured in office and empowered to check legis-
lative excesses; explains the prudence of the Supreme Court's
approval of the Jeffersonian reorganization that eliminated ex-
isting lower federal courts; recounts Supreme Court Justices'
early uses of the formal separation of powers to justify withdraw-
ing themselves from the embrace - then loving, but one day po-
tentially crushing - of the executive and legislative branches;'
and recalls that the earliest efforts to impeach and to convict fed-
eral judges succeeded when the issue was physical and mental
disability (the case of District Judge John Pickering of New
Hampshire)45 but failed when the issue was political disagree-
ment with judicial acts, including rulings from the bench (the case
of Supreme Court Justice Samuel Chase).4 6 In each of these
events, the judicial branch protected itself pragmatically and well,
and for the long future, against encroachments from the so-called
political branches. Judge Pollak's history lessons thus may sound
a hopeful note for those who have been hearing only the din of
today's judge-bashing.
Chief Justice Shirley Abrahamson of the Wisconsin Supreme
Court contributes the remarks she delivered to the ABA Commis-
ing the Court, its Dean). See generally Loren Singer, Even if You're From Boston or Austin,
You May Be a 'Philadelphia Lawyer', WEST'S LEGAL NEWS, Jan. 26, 1996, available in 1996
WL 258193.
43 THE FEDERALIST, Nos. 78, 79, 80, 81 (Alexander Hamilton).
44 See Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dallas) 409, 411-14 n.t (1792) (reproducing the conflict-
ing 1792 opinions of Circuit Court panels that included, in the District of New York, Chief
Justice John Jay and Associate Justice William Cushing; in the District of Pennsylvania,
Justices James Wilson and John Blair; and, in District of North Carolina, Justice James
Iredell); Letter from Chief Justice Jay and the Associate Justices to President George
Washington (August 8, 1793)) reprinted in THE CORRESPONDENCE AND PUBLIC PAPERS OF
JOHN JAY 1763-1826 486-89 (III Henry P. Johnston ed., 1971) (declining the President's
request that the Justices decide questions arising from "transactions within our ports and
limits" - which questions "depend for their solution on the construction of our treaties, on
the laws of nature and nations, and on the laws of the land" - involving France and Brit-
ain) (quoting Letter from Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson to Chief Justice Jay and the
Associate Justices, July 18, 1793).
45 See ELEANORE BUSHNELL, CRMEs, FOLLIES, AND MISFORTUNES: THE FEDERAL IMPEACH-
MENT TRIALS 43, 45-52 (1992).
46 See WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, GRAND INQUESTS: THE HISTORIC IMPEACHMENTS OF JUS-
TICE SAMUEL CHASE AND PRESIDENT ANDREW JOHNSON 74-105 (1992).
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sion in December 1996. She begins by identifying and discussing
the two related but separable types of "judicial independence" that
are embodied in that concept and at issue in each of the articles
that accompanies hers. The first type, institutional or "branch"
independence, concerns the relationships between and among the
judiciary, the executive and the legislature. The second type, indi-
vidual or "decisional" independence, concerns a judge's decision-
making process and freedom. Chief Justice Abrahamson then dis-
cusses these types of judicial independence from a state court
perspective, based on her more than two decades of service on
Wisconsin's highest court. She explains that, in Wisconsin, the
institutional independence of the judiciary benefits from state con-
stitutional protections and legal doctrines that may be unusual.
The institutional independence of Wisconsin's courts also stems
from their relative success in communicating their needs, particu-
larly for funding, to the political branches. Chief Justice Abra-
hamson also considers the state of individual judicial indepen-
dence in Wisconsin. Her discussion and defense of its judicial
election system makes an interesting contrast to Justice Stevens'
stated belief that electing judges is an awful practice.47 Chief Jus-
tice Abrahamson concludes with discussions of the issues and op-
portunities that inhere in judicial communication with the legisla-
tive branch, and with the general public.
The tragedy of the Bayless case for judicial independence gener-
ally is the common belief that Judge Baer, when he faced unprece-
47 See generally Joel Achenbach, Why Reporters Love Judicial Elections, 49 U. MiAU L.
REV. 155 (1994) (describing, with humor and horror, how candidates come to run unop-
posed in Florida's judicial elections).
Chief Justice Abrahamson and Justice Stevens' contrasting views on the merits of an
elected state judiciary may in part be products of their respective geographic bases. Chief
Justice Abrahamson explains her support for electing judges in Wisconsin by referring to
the state's populist tradition and its voters' history of making sound choices. Cf. Jim Do-
herty, In Chilly Green Bay, Curly's Old Team is Still Packing Them In, SMITHSONLkN MAGA-
ZINE 81, 82 (Aug. 1991) ("The Packers ... [are] an institution, the heart and soul of a
community that extends well outside Green Bay to the farthest reaches of the Badger
State, and beyond."). Justice Stevens, a native of Chicago and, with brief exceptions, a life-
long Illinois resident until he joined the Supreme Court, may view judicial elections with
greater skepticism based on his city and state's experiences with judicial corruption. See
Tony Mauro, Courtside: Chicago Lawyers, LEGAL TIMEs, Apr. 21, 1997, at 8 ("oral argument
last week [in Bracy v. Gramley, No. 96-6133] made it clear that Justice John Paul Stevens
keeps up with the legal scene in his home town of Chicago"). See generally JAMEs TUOHY &
ROB WARDEN, GREYLORD: JUSTICE CHICAGO STYLE (1989); cf SAUL BELLOW, THE ACTUAL 87
(1997) ("Judges without exception were on the take, she said, and you couldn't build a
prison big enough to hold all the Chicago judges who were eligible.").
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dented political criticism and threats to his continued tenure as a
federal judge, blinked. Many seem to believe, based on the simple
sequence of events in the case - the Judge's initial decision, fol-
lowed by the criticism, followed by the Judge's second decision,
which reached an opposite result from the first - that the storm
of political criticism caused Judge Baer to change his mind.4"
Judge Baer's actions regrettably fueled the perception that he
blinked. His initial opinion was so ringing a condemnation of the
police, and his remarks when the government first sought recon-
sideration were so dismissive of what he called the prosecutors'
"juvenile project,"49 that it became hard to conceive that his later
change of heart could have been based on the merits of any addi-
tional information he received. Judge Baer also issued his rever-
sal of his initial decision on April Fool's Day.50 That might mean
nothing, but it has been understood as some kind of signal from
the Judge about the decision he was rendering.51
Judge Baer has denied that the Bayless "firestorm" compro-
mised his judicial independence. 52 He deserves to be taken at his
word - on this matter, and on the sincerity of his credibility de-
terminations regarding the testimony of Ms. Bayless and the po-
lice officers who seized the drugs she was transporting in 1995 and
48 E.g., Monroe H. Freedman, The Threat to Judicial Independence By Criticism of
Judges - A Proposed Solution to the Real Problem, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 729, 739-40 (1997)
("Judge Baer got the message. He conducted a rehearing and reversed his decision. And no
one was in doubt about what had happened.") (footnote omitted); Michael Kelly, Judge
Dread, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 31, 1997, at 6 ("Under pressure from Clinton, [Judge
Baer] reversed himself."); R. Eugene Pincham, A New Tyranny Against Judiciary, CHICAGO
TRIBUNE, May 23, 1996, at 30 (letter from retired Illinois Appellate Court justice) (referring
to Judge Baer's "display of judicial weakness" and calling it "appalling that a weak federal
judge would succumb to such criticisms"); Daniel Seligman, Ask Mr. Statistics, FORTUNE,
June 24, 1996, at 165 ("Baer said, hey, just kidding, and reversed himself').
49 See Don Van Natta, Jr., Judge Agrees to Rehear Case on Drugs Seized By the Police,
N.Y. TiMEs, Mar. 6, 1996, at B1 ("In a conference call with lawyers a month ago, Judge
Baer derided prosecutors' bid to get him to change his mind, calling it a 'juvenile project.'").
50 See Bayless 11.
51 See, e.g., Yale Kamisar, Wayne R. LaFave & Jerold H. Israel, 1996 Supplement to
Eighth Editions, Modern Criminal Procedure, Basic Criminal Procedure, Advanced Crimi-
nal Procedure (1996) at 29 ("At the request of the prosecution, a rehearing was held on
March 15th, [1996,] and on the 1st of April (!) Judge Baer reversed his earlier decision.")
(exclamation point in original).
52 See Don Van Natta Jr., Dismissing Defense Effort, Judge Stays on Drug Case, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 13, 1996, at 25 (reporting Judge Baer's denial of Ms. Bayless' motion, following
his reconsideration of his suppression ruling, seeking the Judge's recusal from the case).
Cf Judge Baer Interview, supra note 20, at 811 (Judge Baer referring to his Bayless I "deci-
sion, and frankly the courage to reverse myself when the credibility issues and others were
resolved").
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then obtained her confession.53 But the suspicion persists that
Judge Baer bowed to political pressure when he reversed his ini-
tial suppression ruling. We simply will never know if that suspi-
cion is founded or unfair.
The belief that judicial independence can be compromised - the
belief that threats can affect, and that they have affected, a judge's
decisionmaking independence - is a cancer. It diminishes the
stature of the judiciary in the eyes of the public. Even worse, it
encourages more judge-bashing in the future, which compounds
the danger that some judges truly will give in to pressures not to
follow the law or to seek fairness in their decisions.54
For the next Judge Baer, whose decision gets demonized and
whose tenure on the bench is threatened for political purposes, the
wise course will be to keep on judging.55 If we have done the job of
teaching and reminding ourselves why judicial independence mat-
ters so much in our system of constitutional government, there
will be other voices and groups that can respond effectively - on
behalf of the beleaguered Judge, and in defense of judicial inde-
pendence generally - to the judge-bashers.
53 See Steven Lubet, Judicial Independence and Independent Judges, 25 HOFSTRA L.
REv. 745, 746-47 (1997) (stating that judges who in good faith apply the law as they under-
stand it should not face discipline or have to worry about personal consequences for making
their decisions).
54 See Sarokin, supra note 36, at 15-16 ("I thought that by stepping down from the court
and making my concerns public, I would convey the gravity of this dangerous course [of
politicians mischaracterizing judicial decisions and then using them as political weapons).
Now, a year later, I concede that my grand gesture was a complete fizzle, and indeed,
rather than dissuade the practice, seems to have emboldened it, since it has been followed
by demands... to impeach judges for unpopular decisions."). Id.
55 Depending on the particulars of future political controversy that springs up, including
the litigation posture of the case that it surrounds, the right way to "keep on judging" may
be for a Judge to recuse herself and move on to the next case. In Bayless, Judge Baer should
have recognized that even entertaining the government's motion to reconsider his suppres-
sion decision in the midst of attacks on it and him raised the specter that he could be
perceived as giving in to political pressure. On that basis, with trust in the independence
and ability of his judicial colleagues, he should have recused himself from the case at that
point. His ultimate decision to recuse himself from the Bayless case after he had granted
the government's motion to reconsider, reopened the suppression hearing and then denied
Ms. Bayless' motion to suppress evidence, see United States v. Bayless, 926 F. Supp. 405
(S.D.N.Y. 1996); see also Larry Neumeister, Judge Withdraws from Politically Charged
Drug Case, Assoc. PRESS, May 16, 1996, suggests that Judge Baer belatedly came to this
realization.
For an argument that Judge Baer was legally required to recuse himself from the Bayless
case, see Freedman, supra note 48, at 740-42. Professor Freedman also suggests that
judges at all levels should respond to political judge-bashing by recusing themselves from a
case en masse. This approach would declare that the bashing had aborted the case and
thereby send a message "that irresponsible criticism of decisions in pending cases will
backfire against the critics." Id. at 742-43.
